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When the US Department of Labor (US DOL) released its “List of Goods Produced by 
Child Labor or Forced Labor”1 in September of 2009, cocoa from Cameroon, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria were listed as goods produced by child labor and 
cocoa from Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria were also listed for forced labor.  On the same 
day, US DOL also recommended that cocoa from Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria be included 
on a list of goods believed to be produced by forced or indentured child labor that are 
prohibited from federal government procurement as a result of Executive Order 13126 
which was signed in 1999.2 
 
Immediately following the release of these reports, the International Cocoa Verification 
Board (ICVB) issued a press release calling the reports “counterproductive” and stated 
that they “may jeopardize the very efforts that are underway to address this critically 
important issue.”3  So what is the ICVB and why does it object to the US DOL reports?   
 
As this report will show, chocolate companies have been able to control initiatives 
meant to eliminate forced, child and trafficked labor in West Africa’s cocoa industry 
under the auspices of the Harkin-Engel Protocol.  As a result, the problem of child labor 
continues nine years after the industry committed to end these abuses.  This report is a 
follow-up on recent developments in the Harkin-Engel Protocol process since the 
publication of ILRF’s last cocoa industry report titled “The Cocoa Protocol: Success or 
Failure?” published on June 30, 2008.4   
 
Background 
 
In 2001, reports surfaced internationally about highly abusive conditions in the West 
African cocoa industry, particularly Cote d’Ivoire, including the use of the worst forms 
of child labor, forced labor and trafficked labor.  Initially, the US House of 
Representatives passed legislation requiring chocolate companies to label their 
chocolate child-labor free, but before the bill got to the Senate, the chocolate industry 
                                                 
1 US Department of Labor.  “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.”  Washington, DC, 
September 10, 2009; available from http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2009TVPRA.pdf.  
2 US DOL.  “Notice of Initial Determination Updating the List of Products Requiring Federal Contractor 
Certification as to Forced/Indentured Child Labor Pursuant to Executive Order 13126.”  Federal Register 
74:175 (September 11, 2009); available from 
http://www.dol.gov/federalregister/HtmlDisplay.aspx?DocId=23111&Month=9&Year=2009.  
3 International Cocoa Verification Board.  “The ICVB Comments on the Publication of the US Department 
of Labor’s Reports on Child and Forced Labor.”  Available from 
http://www.cocoaverification.net/index.php.  
4 Available from http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/cocoa-campaign/resources/10719.  
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successfully convinced lawmakers that instead, they would develop a voluntary 
agreement to work toward elimination of child labor in the cocoa industry.  The 
agreement, referred to as the Harkin-Engel Protocol, named after Senator Tom Harkin 
and Representative Eliot Engel, was signed in September 2001 by major chocolate 
companies and required them, among other things, to “develop and implement credible, 
mutually-acceptable, voluntary, industry-wide standards of public certification, consistent 
with applicable federal law, that cocoa beans and their derivative products have been 
grown and/or processed without any of the worst forms of child labor” by July 1, 2005.5 
 
After several missed deadlines, the chocolate industry finally revealed its plan for the 
certification system they were required to implement under the Harkin-Engel Protocol.  
The industry “certification” primarily consists of publicly reported surveys of labor 
conditions on cocoa farms conducted by the governments of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.  
The “certification” program does not contain any standards for labor rights protections 
and has been critiqued by observers for a range of other problems.6  As part of the 
system, the certification reports produced by the governments of Ghana and Cote 
d’Ivoire must then be verified to ensure that the data is accurate. 
 
The original body designed in 2001 to implement verification was an independent 
oversight group that was an independent, third party effort led by the International 
Union of Food Workers (IUF) and the National Consumers League called the 
Verification Working Group (VWG).  The VWG did not include any direct 
representation by industry.  In typical certification programs it is common and 
recommended for verification, monitoring or auditing processes to be conducted by an 
independent, third-party and as such, it was appropriate that the VWG did not include 
industry representation.  This initiative was eventually defunded by the chocolate 
industry in 2006 in favor of a new entity, the ICVB, which was no longer third-party and 
independent and did include industry representation.7   
 
The International Cocoa Verification Board (ICVB) was created with a 
mandate of verifying the accuracy of the government surveys. 
 
That is where the International Cocoa Verification Board (ICVB) enters the story.  Here 
is a brief description of what the ICVB is from its website: 
 
The International Cocoa Verification Board (ICVB) is a non-profit, multi-
stakeholder organization that was convened by Verité in December, 2007, to 
ensure that certification efforts to evaluate the occurrence of child or forced 
                                                 
5 Chocolate Manufacturers Association.  “Protocol for the Growing and Process of Cocoa Beans and Their 
Derivative Products in a Manner That Complies With ILO Convention 182 Concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.”  September 19, 2001; available 
from http://www.cocoaverification.net/Docs/Harkin-Engel%20Protocol.pdf.  
6 “Letter Regarding Cocoa Industry ‘Certification.’”  June 17, 2008; available from 
http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/cocoa-campaign/resources/10716.  
7 International Labor Rights Fund.  “Report on Cocoa and Forced Child Labor.”  October 2006; available 
from http://www.laborrights.org/sites/default/files/publications-and-resources/COCOA06Critique.pdf.  
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adult labor in cocoa producing areas in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are 
independently verified. Verifying the soundness of the data collection 
methodologies and the accuracy of survey the findings [sic] helps to ensure that 
remediation efforts are more strategically focused on the areas and issues that 
are in greatest need of remediation. Reliable data informs meaningful, enduring 
change for cocoa producing communities in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. All 
stakeholders, from governments to civil society actors, will be able to use the 
results of this verification effort to strengthen their work going forward.8 
 
Essentially, as the ICVB states, it’s “primary mandate is to verify the accuracy of the 
certification surveys conducted by the Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana 
initiated under the Harkin-Engel Protocol.”   
 
The ICVB is composed of members of governments and NGOs, but also 
includes company representatives and concerns have been raised about 
conflicts of interest. 
 
The actual Board is made up of nine individuals from Africa, Europe and North America 
who represent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), companies and governments.  
The Board members were selected by Verité which serves as the secretariat of the 
ICVB.  Verité was privately selected by the chocolate industry for this role and “is 
charged with administering and facilitating the activities of the ICVB.”  The original 
members of the Board, according to the official ICVB website, were: 
 
• Isabelle Adam, European Cocoa Association 
• Mme. Acquah, Government of Côte d’Ivoire 
• Stephan Ayidiya, University of Ghana-Legon 
• Tony Fofie, Government of Ghana 
• Alice Koiho-Kipre, Afrique Secours et Assistance  
• Jeff Morgan, Mars Incorporated 
• Diane Mull, International Initiative to End Child Labor 
• Andrews Tagoe, General Agricultural Workers Union of TUC 
• John Trew, CARE International 
 
However, the current list of Board members on the ICVB website has removed Mme. 
Acquah, Tony Fofie and John Trew and instead includes Malick Tohe (identified as the 
Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Cote d’Ivoire) and Antwi Boasiako Sekyere 
(Honorable Deputy Minister for Employment and Social Welfare of Ghana).  John Trew 
has left CARE International since the Board was formed in 2007 and his NGO 
representative seat has not been filled since he left.  In fact, minutes from the September 
2009 ICVB meeting state that replacement of the open civil society seat was “tabled 
pending further discussion.”9 
                                                 
8 ICVB.  “Frequently Asked Questions.”  Available from http://www.cocoaverification.net/faq.php.  
9 ICVB.  “Meeting Minutes and Agreements.”  September 10, 2009; available from 
http://www.cocoaverification.net/Docs/ICVB_September_Minutes.pdf.  
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While the ICVB is pursuing the original Verification Working Group’s mandate, the 
governance and design are completely different.  For example, the ICVB includes 
company representatives.  At the time that the members of the Board were initially 
chosen by Verité, no conflict of interest policy was in place.10 
 
The ICVB has selected verifiers and released verification reports, but it is 
unclear if all recommendations for improvement have been implemented by 
the relevant governments. 
 
The Board was tasked with selecting verifiers who would be the ones to conduct the 
review of the certification reports.  In 2008, the ICVB selected Fafo AIS of Norway and 
Khulisa Management Services of South Africa as the two partner organizations that 
would work together to carry out field research.  Fafo and Khulisa (the verifiers) 
released the initial verification reports in December 2008 and recommended that the 
ICVB accept the results of the certification reports, but advised that acceptance of the 
Ivorian report be conditioned on the re-evaluation of certain statistics. 
 
The report on Cote d’Ivoire notes that the findings and results of the certification study 
related to forced adult labor was below average and that the certification study drew 
conclusions even though “the analysis regarding forced adult labor practices in the 
cocoa sector fell short of providing insights and conclusions about forced adult labor 
practices.”  Similarly, the Cote d’Ivoire verification report notes that the scaled-up 
certification study “didn’t address the issue of child trafficking.”1112  Additionally, in the 
meeting minutes from the December 2008 ICVB meeting, it is stated that “the verifiers 
stressed the need for strengthening and improving survey instruments and 
methodologies that appropriately address” child trafficking and Forced Adult Labor.13  
While some members of the ICVB have expressed strong support for additional 
research focused on child trafficking using appropriate research methods, the ICVB has 
no power to compel anyone to implement that recommendation.  Ultimately, it is 
completely up to companies and to some extent the West African governments 
whether they will follow the recommendations.  The ICVB is weakened in its ability to 
actually implement its recommendations by the same lack of “binding and enforceable 
                                                 
10 ILRF.  “The Cocoa Protocol: Success or Failure?”  June 30, 2008; available from 
http://www.laborrights.org/files/Cocoa%20Protocol%20Success%20or%20Failure%20June%202008.pdf.  
11 Fafo AIS and Khulisa Management Services (Pty) Ltf.  “Final Verification Report: Cote d’Ivoire.”  
Available from http://www.cocoaverification.net/Docs/Verification_Report_Cote_d_Ivoire_FINAL.pdf.  
12 For additional information about weaknesses in the Harkin-Engel Protocol’s attempts to eliminate child 
trafficking, please see: Sheth, Anita. “Such a Long Journey: Barriers to Eliminating Child Trafficking for 
Labor Purposes in the West African Cocoa Value Chain.”  The Protection Project Journal of Human Rights 
and Civil Society, Issue 2, Fall 2009; available from 
http://www.protectionproject.org/bin/e/v/JHU_Journal_vol2_final.pdf.   
13 ICVB.  “International Cocoa Verification Board Minutes.”  December 5, 2008; available from 
http://www.cocoaverification.net/Docs/NYC_12_08_ICVB_BOARD_MINUTES.pdf.  
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labor rights” protections that ILRF recognized as a fatal flaw in the original Harkin-Engel 
Protocol.14  
 
Importantly, to date, there are no commitments to remove the children identified by 
the surveys from harm’s way.  The ICVB has not endorsed any recommendations for 
remediation of child labor in the cocoa sector, nor is there any concrete plan from 
governments or industry to remove these thousands of children from exploitative labor 
and ensure they are receiving an education.  
 
Instead of working on remediation, the ICVB has shifted to make policy 
statements outside of its mandate. 
 
It appears that the ICVB has taken on a different role after its September board meeting 
than its original mandate.  While even the report by the verifiers that was approved by 
the ICVB stated, “both the certification and verification studies in the two countries 
indicated many children are engaged in hazardous child labor,”15 the ICVB still issued a 
press release objecting to the inclusion of cocoa on the US DOL’s list of goods 
produced by child labor.  While the ICVB was created to “to verify the accuracy of the 
certification surveys conducted by the Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana 
initiated under the Harkin-Engel Protocol,” the Board has now apparently taken upon 
itself to issue public policy recommendations.   
 
According to the ICVB meeting notes from September 2009, the ICVB’s statements 
were drafted by Isabelle Adam, a representative of the European Cocoa Association 
(ECA), which is an industry group.16  While the press release by the ICVB does 
commend the US DOL’s “initiative,” not surprisingly, the specific suggestions in the 
ICVB press release would clearly primarily be advantageous to the chocolate companies 
benefiting from low-cost labor by ensuring no disruption in the supply of cocoa that has 
been produced by forced and/or child labor.  Executive Order 13126 actually only 
requires a contractor to make “a good faith effort to determine whether forced or 
indentured child labor was used to mine, produce, or manufacture any product 
furnished under the contract”17 – an assurance that should not be of concern to the 
chocolate companies if the “certification” program developed under the Harkin-Engel 
Protocol actually provided an appropriate assurance that these labor rights abuses were 
not occurring in the production of chocolate.  However, both the “certification” and 
verification reports demonstrate that the worst forms of child labor are occurring. 
 
                                                 
14 ILRF.  “Statement on Industry Protocol Regarding the Use of Child Labor in West African Cocoa 
Farms.”  May 1, 2002; available from http://www.laborrights.org/sites/default/files/publications-and-
resources/COCOACritique.pdf.   
15 Fafo AIS and Khulisa Management Services (Pty) Ltd. “Strategy Report.”  January 2009; available from 
http://www.cocoaverification.net/Docs/Strategy_Report_from_Verifiers_Jan_2009_dated.pdf.  
16 ICVB.  “Meeting Minutes and Agreements.”  September 10, 2009; available from 
http://www.cocoaverification.net/Docs/ICVB_September_Minutes.pdf.   
17 “Executive Order 13126.”  Federal Register 64:115 (June 16, 1999); available from 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1999_register&docid=99-15491-filed.  
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In fact, the tone, message and even wording of the ICVB press release are strikingly 
similar to the press releases from the National Confectioners Association (NCA) – the 
official trade association of the US chocolate industry.  The ICVB says that including 
cocoa on the list “may jeopardize the very efforts that are underway to address this 
critically important issue.”  Meanwhile the NCA says, “Many important partnerships 
delivering positive change on the ground could be jeopardized otherwise - discouraging 
the very progress the DOL list is designed to promote.”18   
 
While of course the individual members of the ICVB may make policy recommendations 
on behalf of their individual organizations, a collective statement on behalf of the ICVB 
issuing political recommendations is inappropriate.  The ICVB’s shift from its mandate of 
assessing data collection techniques toward making public policy recommendations 
closely aligned with those of the major chocolate companies, along with other problems 
outlined here, raises serious questions about the independence of the ICVB.   
 
The chocolate industry is now supplanting the ICVB with a more industry-
friendly Joint Working Group on Labor in Cocoa Farming (JWG). 
 
At this point, the ICVB is seeing reductions in its funding (from the chocolate 
companies) and the Board has decided that it has accomplished its original mandate.  
The future of the ICVB remains unclear. In May 2009, a meeting was held in Ghana to 
discuss the future of “data collection and remediation of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labor and Forced Adult Labor.”19  During the meeting, the attendees agreed to create a 
“Joint Working Group on Labor in Cocoa Farming” (or JWG) and an initial meeting of 
the JWG was held in Cote d’Ivoire in July 2009.  Based on the extremely limited amount 
of public materials available about the JWG, it appears that Verité again is playing the 
role of secretariat and will be under a contract developed and paid for by industry 
representatives.   
 
The JWG is structured so that the governments of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire and the 
chocolate industry constitute three different delegations that are responsible for 
choosing and replacing their representatives.  The group consists of two industry 
representatives, four government representatives from each country and, in principle, 
one civil society organization selected by each government.  No guidelines for choosing 
the government or industry representatives appear to exist.  The initial NGO selected 
for one of the two “civil society” seats, UNICEF, suggests that no genuinely grassroots 
groups will be given a seat at this table. 
 
The JWG lacks genuine, democratic participation from civil society organizations and 
cocoa farmers and workers.  Neither of the two civil society representatives in the 
JWG are from organizations directly representing or constituting farmers or children or 
                                                 
18 National Confectioners Association.  “Cocoa Industry Calls on U.S. Department of Labor to Recognize 
and Encourage Progress in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana.”  September 10, 2009; available from 
http://www.candyusa.com/News/PRdetail.cfm?ItemNumber=1797.   
19 NCA.  “NCA Please to Support the Creation of a Joint Working Group on Labor in Cocoa Farming.”  
October 6, 2009; available from http://www.candyusa.com/News/PRdetail.cfm?ItemNumber=1932.   
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any other grassroots group from the affected countries as members.  Authentic and 
meaningful participation of affected communities is clearly absent in the JWG.20 
 
The main responsibilities of the JWG, according to the National Confectioners 
Association, include: 
• Determining indicators, benchmarks, and methods for future data 
collection efforts;  
• Conducting a meta-analysis – a process which will inform the frequency 
and scope of future sector-wide surveys;  
• Coordination of future remediation;  
• Creating "data-gathering modules" for possible addition to future national 
surveys as an efficient method of sector wide data collection;  
• Consulting trafficking experts to help create guidelines for future 
research including possible methodologies and root cause analysis.21  
According to the minutes of the September 2009 ICVB meeting, the ICVB is slated to 
transition into the JWG once the details of a process are worked out.22  Additionally, 
the agreements from the July 2009 JWG meeting state that the JWG “will be the focal 
point for all activities involved in the 4 [sic] stage process certification.”23  It appears 
certain that the JWG will supplant the ICVB.  When that happens, the cocoa industry 
will successfully eliminate the last remaining vestige of the original Harkin-Engel Protocol 
multi-stakeholder process, having begun by unilaterally defunding the original 
Verification Working Group, replacing it with one of their liking, and finally dispensing 
with the ICVB entirely.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As US consumers spend billions of dollars on chocolate this Valentine’s Day, the major 
chocolate companies continue to break the hearts of cocoa farmers, children and 
concerned consumers globally. 
 
The Harkin-Engel Protocol originally envisioned a process where industry oversight 
would be exercised by global unions and consumer representatives.  That vision of 
accountable oversight was abandoned in 2005.  While the ICVB’s role is problematic as 
described above, the JWG appears to be even less transparent and representative.  
Moreover, the “certification” process that is being verified is highly problematic as it 
contains neither standards nor any clear commitment to connect the data with effective 
                                                 
20 Joint Working Group.  “Joint Working Group on Labor in Cocoa Farming.”  July 2009; available from 
http://www.verite.org/node/174.   
21 NCA.  “NCA Please to Support the Creation of a Joint Working Group on Labor in Cocoa Farming.”  
October 6, 2009; available from http://www.candyusa.com/News/PRdetail.cfm?ItemNumber=1932.   
22 ICVB.  “Meeting Minutes and Agreements.”  September 10, 2009; available from 
http://www.cocoaverification.net/Docs/ICVB_September_Minutes.pdf.   
23 Joint Working Group.  “Joint Working Group on Labor in Cocoa Farming.”  July 2009; available from 
http://www.verite.org/node/174.   
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remediation.  In brief, after nine years, the chocolate industry data collection 
has yet to result in a single child being removed from exploitative labor.  That 
is why many large chocolate companies are increasingly agreeing to work with separate 
certification programs for their cocoa that do include labor rights standards.  
 
The recent trajectory of industry efforts outlined above raises key questions.   
• What is the industry and West African governments’ plan to remove children 
from the worst forms of child labor and rehabilitate children?  Additionally, what 
is the plan to deal specifically with victims of forced labor and trafficking? 
• What is the role of global and local civil society in providing recommendations 
and input in to the design of these programs? 
• When and how will the chocolate industry work with grassroots groups on the 
ground and internationally to develop solutions to these labor rights abuses? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For more information about the International Labor Rights Forum and child labor in the cocoa 
industry please visit www.LaborRights.org. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
2009 Cocoa Updates 
 
 
New Company Commitments: 
Fair Trade 
• Nestlé UK commits to achieving Fairtrade certification for Kit Kat bars in the 
UK and Ireland beginning in January 2010 (Announced: December 7, 2009). 
o Nestlé  press release: 
http://www.nestle.com/MediaCenter/NewsandFeatures/AllNewsFeatures/KitKat_Fairtra
de_UK_Ireland.htm  
o Fairtrade Foundation press release: 
http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/press_office/press_releases_and_statements/december_20
09/kit_kat_gives_cocoa_farmers_in_cte_divoire_a_break.aspx  
o ILRF, Global Exchange, Green America and Oasis USA press release: 
http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-forced-labor/cocoa-campaign/news/12232  
• Cadbury commits to achieving Fairtrade certification for Cadbury Dairy Milk bar 
in UK and Ireland by the end of Summer 2009 (Announced: March 4, 2009).  
Cadbury then commits to certifying Cadbury Dairy Milk Fairtrade in Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand by early 2010 (Announced: August 25, 2009). 
o Cadbury press releases: http://www.cadbury.com/media/press/Pages/cdmfairtrade.aspx 
and http://www.cadbury.com/media/press/Pages/ftcdmanzcan.aspx  
o ILRF and Global Exchange press release: http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-
labor/cocoa-campaign/news/11837  
 
Rainforest Alliance  
** Please see this document outlining ILRF’s concerns with Rainforest Alliance certification: 
http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/cocoa-campaign/resources/10821 ** 
• Kraft Foods commits to use cocoa beans only from Rainforest Alliance certified 
farms across it’s entire Côte d’Or and Marabou lines by the end of 2012 
(Announced: Oct. 30, 2009). 
o Rainforest Alliance press release: http://www.rainforest-
alliance.org/news.cfm?id=kraft_cocoa 
o Kraft press release: http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=129070&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1348441  
 
• Blommer Chocolate Company will offer a line of Rainforest Alliance Certified 
cocoa and ingredient chocolate products starting in 2010 (Announced: June 25, 
2009). 
o Rainforest Alliance press release: http://www.rainforest-
alliance.org/news.cfm?id=blommer_cocoa  
 
• Mars, Incorporated aims to certify the Galaxy chocolate bar in the UK with 
Rainforest Alliance by early 2010.  Mars also commits to getting its entire cocoa 
supply certified by 2020 (Announced: April 8, 2009). 
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o Rainforest Alliance press release: http://www.rainforest-
alliance.org/news.cfm?id=mars_partnership  
o Mars, Inc. press release: 
http://www.mars.com/global/News+and+media/Global+Press+Releases/Mars+commits
+to+global+certification.htm  
o ILRF and Organic Consumers Association press release:  
http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/cocoa-campaign/news/11854   
 
UTZ Certified 
• Nestlé, Heinz, Mars, Cargill, Ahold, ECOM, Chocolat Frey and Ludwig 
Schokolade GMBH & Co. KG all joined the UTZ Certified cocoa program 
previous to 2009.  In 2009, the first two cocoa cooperatives, both in Ivory 
Coast, received UTZ certification (Announced: September 9, 2009). 
o UTZ Certified 2008 press release: 
http://www.utzcertified.org/index.php?pageID=104&showItem=257&filterCat=B&offse
t=5 
o UTZ Certified 2009 press release: 
http://www.utzcertified.org/index.php?pageID=104&showItem=413&filterCat=B  
o Cargill press release on first cooperative certification: http://cargill.com/news-
center/news-releases/2009/NA3019789.jsp 
o Mars, Inc. on purchase of first UTZ certified beans: 
http://www.mars.com/global/News+and+media/Global+Press+Releases/MARS+INCOR
PORATED+achieves+milestone.htm  
 
• Barry Callebaut joins UTZ Certified cocoa program (Announced: October 28, 
2009). 
o UTZ Certified press release: 
http://www.utzcertified.org/index.php?pageID=104&switchlanguage=EN  
 
Other 
• Nestlé announces new “Cocoa Plan” (Announced: October 2009) 
o Nestlé press release: 
http://www.nestle.com/MediaCenter/NewsandFeatures/AllNewsFeatures/Nestle_launch
es_The_Cocoa_Plan_sustainability_initiative.htm  
o Nestlé Cocoa Plan website: http://www.thecocoaplan.com  
 
Other Updates: 
• ILRF and campaign allies organize the third annual “Reverse Trick-or-Treating” 
action where thousands of young people across the US and Canada deliver Fair 
Trade chocolate and information about labor rights abuses in the cocoa industry 
to the houses where they go trick-or-treating on Halloween.  This year, a 
quarter of a million households were reached through this action (Announced: 
October 31, 2009). 
o Reverse Trick-or-Treating website: www.ReverseTrickOrTreating.org  
 
• Tulane University’s Payson Center for International Development releases it’s 
third annual report as part of a contract from the US Department of Labor to 
provide oversight of public and private initiatives to eliminate the worst forms of 
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child labor in the cocoa sector in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana (Announced: October 
2009). 
o Tulane University report: http://childlabor-payson.org/  
 
• The formation of a “Joint Working Group on Labor in Cocoa Farming (JWG)” 
including the chocolate industry, representatives of the governments of Ghana 
and Cote d’Ivoire and several civil society representatives is announced.  Verité 
currently services as the secretariat for the JWG (Announced: October 6, 2009). 
o National Confectioners Association press release: 
http://www.candyusa.com/News/PRdetail.cfm?ItemNumber=1932  
o Verité JWG page: http://www.verite.org/node/174  
 
• US Department of Labor lists cocoa from Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Guinea and Nigeria as produced by child labor and cocoa from Cote d’Ivoire and 
Nigeria as also produced by forced labor as part of it’s “List of Goods Produced 
by Child Labor and Forced Labor” as required by the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Acts of 2005 and 2008 (Announced September 10, 
2009). 
o US DOL List: http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2009TVPRA.pdf  
o US DOL press release: http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ilab/ILAB20090946.htm  
o ILRF press release: http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-forced-labor/news/12102  
o National Confectioners Association press release: 
http://www.candyusa.com/News/PRdetail.cfm?ItemNumber=1797  
 
• US Department of Labor also recommends that cocoa from Cote d’Ivoire and 
Nigeria be included on a list of products produced by forced or indentured child 
labor that are prohibited from government procurement as part of Executive 
Order 13126 of 1999 (Announced: September 10, 2009). 
o US DOL notice: 
http://www.dol.gov/federalregister/HtmlDisplay.aspx?DocId=23111&Month=9&Year=
2009  
o US DOL background information on EO 13126: 
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/regs/eo13126/main.htm  
o National Confectioners Association press release: 
http://www.candyusa.com/News/PRdetail.cfm?ItemNumber=1798  
 
• ILRF and campaign partners launch a Fair Trade S’mores summer action where 
people across the country make s’mores using Fair Trade chocolate and sign 
petitions to Hershey (Announced: Summer 2009). 
o We Want More from our S’mores: http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/cocoa-
campaign/we-want-more-from-our-smores or 
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/fairtrade/cocoa/smoresproject.html  
 
• ILRF and campaign partners launch a campaign targeting Hershey with a national 
call-in day.  Hershey was chosen as a campaign target due to the fact that they 
have not agreed to any of the additional certification programs (Announced: June 
23, 2009). 
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o Call-in day announcement: http://www.unionvoice.org/laborrights/notice-
description.tcl?newsletter_id=26410742  
 
• The International Cocoa Verification Board meets in Ghana to review the 
verification reports for Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana (Announced: Meetings took 
place in March 2009; Resolutions release April 24, 2009). 
o ICVB Board Meeting Resolutions: 
http://www.cocoaverification.net/Docs/ICVB_RESOLUTIONS.pdf  
 
• Gates Foundation pledges $90 million to cocoa and cashew farmers -- $23 
million to the World Cocoa Foundation and $25 million to the German 
development organization GTZ (Announced: February 29, 2009). 
o Gates Foundation press release: http://www.gatesfoundation.org/press-
releases/Pages/african-cocoa-and-cashew-farmers-090218.aspx  
o WCF press release: http://www.worldcocoafoundation.org/what-we-do/current-
programs/CocoaLivelihoodsProgram_summary.asp  
 
• ILRF releases 2009 Chocolate Company Scorecard which ranks chocolate 
companies based on their commitment to ending child labor and ensuring 
transparency in their cocoa supply chains (Announced: February 12, 2009). 
o ILRF 2009 Chocolate Company Scorecard: http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-
labor/cocoa-campaign/resources/10796  
 
• ILRF releases analysis of the implementation of the Harkin-Engel Protocol timed 
with the July 1, 2008 deadline (Announced: June 30, 2008). 
o “Cocoa Protocol: Success or Failure?”: http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/cocoa-
campaign/resources/10719  
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APPENDIX B 
June 17, 2008 
Senator Tom Harkin 
731 Hart Senate Office Building 
Washington, DC 20510 
 
Dear Senator Harkin, 
 
We would like to commend your efforts to end the worst forms of child labor in the 
cocoa industry and your commitment to establishing monitoring and certification 
systems to improve labor conditions around the world and in particular to ensure that 
children are not exploited in the production of goods for US consumers. 
 
While we respect the tremendous efforts your office has undertaken since 2001, we are 
concerned that the “certification concept” put forth by the cocoa industry in relation to 
cocoa production is neither a process certification nor a product certification, and offers 
no assurance to consumers that the corporations profiting from chocolate sales in the 
US have taken steps to eliminate child labor within their supply chains. Rather, industry 
has put forth a model that merely identifies at a national and regional level, the work 
that governments are doing to survey the types and forms of labor abuses that occur.  
 
Certification systems share at least four common elements.24 First, a certification system 
requires the development of a set of standards that must be met in order to achieve 
certification.  Second, certification must provide a process for verifying that a product, 
service or person has met those standards. Third, a “certification mark” identifies that 
the standard and verification have been fulfilled. Finally, certification requires a system 
for auditing to ensure that the “certification mark” is being applied in a manner 
consistent with the standards over time. 
 
In its work to establish a public certification system as part of the Harkin Engel Protocol, 
the cocoa industry has not established clear standards within a multi-stakeholder setting.  
The industry’s proposed model suggests that certification simply means verifying the 
results of a census. In the case of cocoa, what the industry apparently is certifying are 
the Child Labor Monitoring Systems (CLMS) developed by the national governments 
with the assistance of the ILO as representing a statistically valid and replicable process 
for identifying the incidence and causes of child labor. However, this certification 
“concept” will not provide assurances “that cocoa beans and their derivative products 
have been grown and/or processed without any of the worst forms of child labor 
(WFCL),” as was the stated intent behind the Harkin-Engel Protocol. To the contrary, 
considering the widespread incidence of the WFCL in cocoa production, the likely 
outcome of the industry’s proposed cocoa “certification” will be to simply confirm that 
child labor is used in the production and processing of cocoa. 
 
                                                 
24 See Conroy, Michael. Branded!. 2007. 
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While we believe that the government CLMS programs are vital for developing a full 
understanding of the causes of child labor that will guide national governmental efforts 
to eliminate child and forced labor, these monitoring systems are not designed to serve 
as certification. As described by the ILO, the Child Labor Monitoring System is intended 
to provide national governments the necessary tools for identifying the incidence and 
causes of child labor within a sector in order to design remediation programs. 
 
In the case of the cocoa sector, the “certification program” that is being established by 
the cocoa industry appears to be an attempt to broaden the commonly understood 
definition of a certification system, a fact recognized by the industry itself as it seeks to 
develop an entirely new “concept” of certification without the benefit of a genuine 
participatory multi-stakeholder process with clear rules of decision-making that will 
ensure an outcome acceptable to all stakeholders. 
 
At this time, the “certification concept” put forth by the cocoa industry does not 
involve the necessary industry-side components that would ensure a valid certification 
program. There is no commitment to increasing transparency measures within supply 
chains.  Significantly, the model developed by industry does not include any binding 
commitments or a plan of action for remediation, as would be required under a 
certification program.   
 
We hope that you will work with industry to raise these concerns about an appropriate 
definition of certification. 
 
Sincerely, 
Americans for Informed Democracy 
Co-op America 
Dominican Sisters of Springfield, IL 
Equal Exchange 
Global Exchange 
Kopali Organics 
International Labor Rights Forum 
Ithaca Fine Chocolates 
New York State Labor-Religion Coalition 
Oasis USA 
Organic Consumers Association 
Stop the Traffik 
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee 
 
 
